SHOCKING FINDINGS OF THE SEA HORSE TRAGEDY!
HIGHLIGHTS of the MAIB report on the Sea Horse accident: Having considered all the information gathered during the course of this investigation, the MAIB has established the following:
1. Proper loading practices with regards to petroleum products were not followed by IDC and the Prison Authorities. The onus ison the master of the vessel to ensure that cargo is properly loaded and stowed.
2. SEYPEC as the distributor of petroleum fuel should not have loaded Mogas in IBCs. It is to be noted this practice is not acceptable in their depot, yet this was allowed outside of their facility.
3. Upon receipt of notification of such an incident, SMSA is the Authority mandated to assess and coordinate the response from start to finish. In this case IDC unilaterally took charge of the operation whilst the relevant authorities were reliant on IDC for resources for the operation.
4. No planned search and rescue operation was conducted in line with established search and rescue procedures by the mandated authorities. The surface search operation carried out was being managed byIDC. There was no other or concurrent search and rescue operation carried out by any other authority.
5. First response to the incident was not well-coordinated, nor was it carried out by persons trained in search and rescue operations.
6. The search operation that was being conducted by IDC was called off under 48 hours later, as announced by IDC in the media. No other search operation was underway nor was any initiated following the announcement that the search was being called off.
7. There were several possible sources of ignition on board at the time of the incident. These include the main engine inlet vent fans, electrical extension cable leading from the accommodation to the deep freezer in the container, the two deep freezers stowed in an enclosed container themselves and battery poles connection on the tele handler. Additionally, there were two known smokers on board the vessel, one of whom was on watch at the time of the incident. Volatile fuel on board being carried as deck cargo in flow-bins further fuelled the fire.
8. There were no records of safety drill carried out as per normal practice of the industry.
9. No life-saving appliances (fixed or personal) were used by any member of Sea Horse’s crew during the entire accident.
10. There are no established communication procedures and record-keeping between the vessel and the management company.
11. IDC has no laid-down procedures for the carriage and stowage of dangerous goods.
12. The outcome of this incident could have been different had there not been delay in mobilisation of re-sources and response. Had competent personnel/authorities been mobilised in a timely manner, the SAR results could have possibly been more positive.
13. There was no port clearance issued to Sea Horse for this particularvoyage. No records exist at SPA for previous voyages since June 2018.
SOURCE:http://www.seymaritimesafety.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=179125%2 / 2
